Justice Souter\u27s  Keep-What-You-Want-and-Throw-Away-the-Rest  Interpretation of \u3cem\u3eStare Decisis\u3c/em\u3e by Koehler, David K.
Buffalo Law Review 
Volume 42 Number 3 Article 6 
10-1-1994 
Justice Souter's "Keep-What-You-Want-and-Throw-Away-the-Rest" 
Interpretation of Stare Decisis 
David K. Koehler 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
David K. Koehler, Justice Souter's "Keep-What-You-Want-and-Throw-Away-the-Rest" Interpretation of Stare 
Decisis, 42 Buff. L. Rev. 859 (1994). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol42/iss3/6 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at 
Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital 
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
Justice Souter's
"Keep-What-You-Want-and-Throw-Away-
the-Rest" Interpretation of Stare Decisis
DAVID K KOEHLERt
'Tower, not reason, is the new currency of this Court's deci-
sion-making."' The late Justice Thurgood Marshall advanced this
scathing criticism in Payne v. Tennessee-a final angry dissent is-
sued on the day of his retirement.2 Voicing tremendous consterna-
tion over the state of stare decisis at the Supreme Court, Justice
Marshall asserted that the Court's change of position in Payne was
but a function of a change in the Court's composition.3 He decried
the majority's opinion as an ominous one which would send "a clear
signal that scores of established constitutional liberties are now ripe
for reconsideration, thereby inviting the very type of open defiance
of our precedents that the majority rewards in this case."4 According
to Marshall, the "Court owe[d] more to its constitutional prece-
dents."5
In stressing the need to remain faithful to precedent in Payne,
Justice Marshall cited a dissent Justice David H. Souter wrote when
he was on the New Hampshire Supreme Court.' In this New Hamp-
t J.D., 1994, University at Buffalo School of Law.
1. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 844 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting). In Payne, the
Court overruled two cases-one decided just two terms prior--and held that victim impact
statements may be admitted at the sentencing phase of a capital trial. See infra part II.B.
2. Linda Greenhouse, High Court Widens Evidence in Capital Cases, N.Y. TIMES,
June 28, 1991, at Al.
3. Responding to Marshall's "power not reason" statement, Justice Scalia asserted to
the contrary: "[WIhat would enshrine power as the governing principle of this Court is the
notion that an important constitutional decision with plainly inadequate rational support
must be left in place for the sole reason that it once attracted five votes." Payne, 501 U.S.
at 834 (Scalia, J., concurring).
4. Id. at 845 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
5. Id. However, Marshall's criticism must be viewed with some degree of skepticism
given his willingness to overrule many precedents during the height of Warren Court ac-
tivism. See Earl M. Maltz, Abortion, Precedent, and the Constitution: A Comment on
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 11,
23-24, 30 (1992) ("Marshall's vigorous defense of the doctrine of stare decisis in Payne is
most charitably described as disingenuous."); see also Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 618 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that stare decisis "is
not an 'imprisonment of reason'" (quoting United States v. International Boxing Club,
348 U.S. 236, 249 (1955) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting))).
6. Payne, 501 U.S. at 849 (citing Appeal of Concerned Corporators of the Portsmouth
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shire dissent, Souter quoted the United States Supreme Court in
support of his argument for the essential need to follow stare deci-
sis.7 Rather than directly quote the Supreme Court's language, Mar-
shall instead opted to cite Souter's dissent.' Ostensibly, Marshall's
unconventional act may be interpreted as acerbic criticism of
Souter's concurrence with the Payne majority; however, it also may
be interpreted as a lesson from the elder departing Justice to the
new kid in town.
This Comment addresses Souter's interpretation and applica-
tion of stare decisis9 during his first two terms on the United States
Sav. Bank, 525 A.2d 671, 701 (N.H. 1987) (Souter, J., dissenting)).
7. Appeal of Concerned Corporators of the Portsmouth Sav. Bank, 525 A.2d 671, 701
(N.H. 1987) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[Sitare decisis... 'is essential if case-by-case judicial
decision-making is to be reconciled with the principle of the rule of law, for when govern-
ing legal standards are open to revision in every case, deciding cases becomes a mere ex-
ercise of judicial will, with arbitrary and unpredictable results.'" (quoting Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 786-87 (1986) (White,
J., dissenting))).
8. Payne, 501 U.S. at 849. Justice Marshall later includes Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986), and implicitly, the right
to abortion as recognized by Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), as one of a laundry list of
17 five-four decisions now indeterminate when one applies the majority's criteria in
Payne for overruling precedent where "a case either was decided or reaffirmed by a 5-4
margin 'over spirited dissen[t].' "Payne, 501 U.S. at 851 (quoting majority opinion at 829).
No irony is lost on the fact that for the sake of upholding the "essential holding" of Roe,
Souter and the majority in Casey essentially overturned Thornburgh.
9. The maxim stare decisis is short for stare decisis et non quieta moevre-literally to
"stand by the thing decided and do not disturb the calm." James C. Rehnquist, Note, The
Power That Shall Be Vested in a Precedent: Stare Decisis, The Constitution and the Su-
preme Court, 66 B.U. L. REV. 345, 347 (1986). BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)
defines stare decisis as:
Policy of courts to stand by precedent and not to disturb settled point. Doctrine
that, when a court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a cer-
tain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle, and apply it to all future
cases, where facts are substantially the same; regardless of whether the parties
and property are the same.
Id. at 1406 (citations omitted).
Stare decisis is a judge-made doctrine historically rife with ambiguity. The impetus
for the doctrine dates back to the infancy of English Common Law during the thirteenth
century when decisions first began to be recorded. See generally Robert A. Sprecher, The
Development of the Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the Extent to Which It Should Be Ap-
plied, 31 A.B.A. J. 501, 501 n.9 (1945). By 1765, Blackstone indicated that it was "an es-
tablished rule to abide by former precedents, where the same points come again in litiga-
tion." Id. at 502 (citing BLACKSTONE, COMIENTARIES 69 (Cooley 3rd ed. 1884)). But there
were exceptions to the "absolute" nature such as when following a precedent was plainly
"'unreasonable and inconvenient'-that is, if it is obviously contrary to statute or well es-
tablished principle." Id. at 503 (citations omitted).
During the early days of the Republic, Alexander Hamilton wrote: "To avoid an arbi-
trary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they should be bound down by strict
rules and precedents." THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). Despite strict ap-
plication of stare decisis in the United States during the nineteenth century, Justice
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Supreme Court with a critical focus on Planned Parenthood v.
Casey.10 Part I examines Souter's early stare decisis jurisprudence as
gleaned from his tenure as a judge in New Hampshire and his tes-
timony at the Senate confirmation hearings. Part H presents an ex-
position of Souter's pragmatic approach to the doctrine of stare deci-
sis. Individual principles of this approach are articulated in three
cases, James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia," Payne v. Tennes-
Brandeis' seminal dissent that the doctrine is not an "inexorable command" has been fre-
quently cited. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting). Therein, Brandeis noted that although tending toward uniformity, the deci-
sion whether to follow stare decisis "is a question entirely within the discretion of the
court." Id. at 406 (quoting Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205, 212 (1910)). Further, Bran-
deis noted that constitutional cases are "practically impossible" to correct by legislative
action and consequently "this Court has often overruled its earlier decisions. The Court
bows to the lessons of experience and the forces of better reasoning, recognizing that the
process of trial and error, so fruitful in the physical sciences, is appropriate also in the
judicial function." Id. at 406-08 (extensive citations omitted).
The doctrine of stare decisis has evolved over time and "interchangeably describes
either obedience to precedent, or obedience to precedent absent some countervailing con-
siderations." Rehnquist, supra at 347 n.15 (comparing Harry W. Jones, Dyson Distin-
guished Lecture: Precedent and Policy in Constitutional Law, 4 PACE L. REV. 11, 19 (1983)
and Stanley Reed, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Law, 9 PA. B. ASS'N Q. 131, 133
(1938)). For a contemporary example of the present lack of credence paid to the doctrine,
see Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (overruling National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (overruling Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S.
183 (1968))). In Garcia, both Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor dissented,
stating that the majority's ruling should be overruled at the first opportunity. Id. at 580,
589.
This Comment harbors no delusion of adding to the wealth of scholarship addressing
the general issue of stare decisis and the Supreme Court. For a more detailed analysis of
stare decisis, see Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Decision-
making and Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 68 (1991); Henry P. Monaghan, Stare Decisis
and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUmi. L. REV. 723 (1988); John Wallace, Comment,
Stare Decisis and the Rehnquist Court: The Collision of Activism, Passivism, and Politics
in Casey, 42 BUFF. L. REV. 187 (1994).
10. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). Although the scope of this Comment addresses Souter's
first two terms on the Supreme Court, Souter's subsequent opinions during his third term
are not inconsistent with the arguments presented herein. See, e.g., United States v.
Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2881, 2891 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part) (noting that he would not invite the consequences of overruling
what he considered correctly decided precedent concerning double jeopardy (citing Grady
v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990)); St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2757,
2765 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that he could not join the majority in aban-
doning Title VII precedent because "stare decisis [has] special force in the area of statu-
tory interpretation" (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-73
(1989)); Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2247-50
(1993) (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (asserting that
since the decision in Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), was overbroad, not
adequately briefed or argued, and at odds with precedent, it should "be reexamined con-
sistent with principles of stare decisis").
11. 501 U.S. 529 (1991).
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see,'2 and Lee v. Weisman, 3 addressing the commercial, criminal,
and constitutional contexts, respectively. From an examination of
these cases, it is clear that for Souter context determines the inter-
pretation and application of stare decisis. Part III analyzes Souter's
opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,4 wherein he synthesizes
the distinct principles articulated in Beam, Payne, and Lee to create
a definitive construct within which the doctrine of stare decisis is to
be interpreted. Part IV deconstructs Souter's interpretation of stare
decisis and concludes that his approach to stare decisis is merely a
function of his pragmatic approach to the rule of law as the law of
consequences.
I. SOUTER'S EARLY STARE DECISIS JURISPRUDENCE
When Souter was nominated to the United States Supreme
Court in the summer of 1990, he was considered something of an
enigma. 5 The "stealth candidate," as Souter came to be known,
lacked a "paper trail" of clearly defined views and left many wonder-
ing just where the independent-minded and somewhat reclusive ju-
rist from Weare, New Hampshire stood on the pressing issues of the
day.'6
12. 501 U.S. 808, 835 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring).
13. 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2667 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring).
14. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
15. At the time of Souter's nomination, the late Justice Thurgood Marshall's depre-
cating comment that he had never heard of Souter was a typical reaction. See e.g., Linda
Greenhouse, Hot Words of a Justice are Hardly a Surprise, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1990, at
AS. In many ways, the media's appellation of Souter as the "stealth candidate" was an ac-
curate description. One of President Bush's senior advisors was quoted as saying that the
President had purposely looked for a conservative jurist whose views on the subject of
abortion were "a little fuzzed up." Maureen Dowd, Dole Wary That Abortion May Color
Court Selection, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1990, at AS. For a typical reaction of popular mass
media to Souter's nomination, see Richard Lacayo, A Blank Slate; Hoping to Place a Con-
servative on the Supreme Court Without a Bloody Confirmation Fight, Bush Picks a Man
Nobody Knows, TIME, Aug. 6, 1990, at 16.
However, as a potential nominee, Souter was not as unknown-at least in political
circles-as the public was led to believe. He, in fact, had been considered for the Supreme
Court nominations that eventually went to Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony M.
Kennedy. Maureen Dowd, Souter, New Hampshire Judge, Named by Bush for High
Court; 'No Litmus Test"President Says, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1990, at Al.
16. In the summer of 1990, the media was abuzz questioning who Souter was and
what he stood for. The tension over the precarious balance struck between liberals and
conservatives on the Court--a balance that was listing toward the right after more than
two decades without a nomination by a president of the Democratic party--generated
generous turmoil regarding Souter's nomination. Inspired both by the polarized nature of
the Court and the mystery surrounding the nominee, the public demanded that senators
discover Souter's precise stance on controversial issues. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, An
Activist's Legacy, N.Y. TIMEs, July 22, 1990, at Al; Linda Greenhouse, Brennan, Key Lib-
eral, Quits Supreme Court; Battle for Seat Likely, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1990, at Al;
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A. New Hampshire Stare Decisis Jurisprudence
At the time of Souter's nomination, he was a judge on the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. Having been
elevated to the First Circuit only five months prior to his nomination
to the Supreme Court, he was not afforded much, if any, opportunity
to participate in opinion writing at the federal appellate level. Con-
sequently, there are no opinions to his credit from the First Circuit
regarding the application of stare decisis. However, an indication of
Souter's early stare decisis philosophy is ascertainable from an ex-
amination of his New Hampshire opinions.
Prior to Souter's nomination to the First Circuit, he had served
as a judge on both the Superior Court and the Supreme Court of
New Hampshire. 7 His decisions displayed a marked respect for
stare decisis. Oftentimes Souter found it necessary to adhere strictly
to precedent, even when this position required following cases he
considered improperly decided. For example, in Cacavas v. Maine
Bonding & Casualty Co.,18 Souter asserted that in the interest of
consistency, he was bound to follow precedent even though he
thought it was wrongly decided. 9 The sentiments in Cacavas echo
those of New Hampshire v. Meister,"0 an earlier concurrence by
Souter, in which he asserted: "The consequences of what I believe
was an unsound conclusion in that case are not serious enough to
outweigh the value of stare decisis."2'
Souter's respect for precedent at the state level was particularly
apparent in the commercial and statutory context. His dissent in
Appeal of Concerned Corporators of the Portsmouth Savings Bank2
expressed his adherence to stare decisis in the commercial context.
Although acknowledging that the weight of precedent may vary with
context, Souter argued that in the commercial context only the
"weightiest of reasons"2 can compel overruling because "'presum-
ably, individuals may have arranged their affairs in reliance upon
Lacayo, supra note 15.
17. Souter served as an associate justice of the New Hampshire Superior Court from
1978-1983, and as an associate justice of the New Hampshire Supreme Court from
1983-1990. JOAN BISKUPIC, THE SUPREM COURT YEARBOOK: 1991-1992, at 214 (1993).
18. 512 A.2d 423, 426 (N.H. 1986) (Souter, J., concurring specially) (asserting the
need for consistency in uninsured motorist cases).
19. Id.
20. 480 A.2d 200, 204 (N.H. 1984) (Souter, J., concurring specially) (questioning the
eligibility of a petitioner to obtain a hearing to annul his criminal conviction record).
21. Id. (referring to a position he had taken as a trial judge in State v. Roger M., 424
A.2d 1139 (N.H. 1981), that was overruled on appeal).
22. 525 A.2d 671, 693 (N.H. 1987) (Souter, J., dissenting) (dissenting from the
majority's holding that mutual savings depositors possessed property interests for cash
distributions from a bank's surplus upon liquidation and acquisition).
23. Id. at 701.
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the expected stability of decision.' "4 He asserted that the majority
opinion engendered uncertainty and erred in overruling precedent
because stare decisis is "'a principle of policy' which 'is essential if
case-by-case judicial decision-making is to be reconciled with the
principle of the rule of law, for when governing legal standards are
open to revision in every case, deciding cases becomes a mere exer-
cise of judicial will, with arbitrary and unpredictable results.' "25 He
concluded that the majority had "not faced the facts or the effects of
overruling our prior law."26
Similarly, when interpreting statutory workman's compensa-
tion benefits in Petition of Robert Correia,2 7 Souter concluded: "Our
obligation is to construe the statute, not to render its language
meaninglessly protean. Once the statute has been construed, stare
decisis calls for a reasonable degree of certainty in applying that
construction to future cases, subject always to the legislature's
power to modify the statute itself."28
B. Senate Confirmation Hearings Testimony
For most observers living outside of New Hampshire, the first
introduction to Souter and his judicial philosophy occurred at his
September 1990 Senate confirmation hearings. 9 When questioned
about his view of stare decisis, Souter demonstrated respect for the
doctrine, describing it as a "bedrock necessity if we are going to have
in our judicial systems anything that can be called 'the rule of law'
as opposed simply to random decisions on a case-by-case basis.""
Souter also attempted to quell Senate fears-especially those on the
24. Id. (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 221-22 (1961) (Frankfurter, J,, dis-
senting), overruled on other grounds, Monnell v. New York City Dep't of Social Serva., 436
U.S. 658 (1978)).
25. Id. (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 221-22 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dis-
senting), overruled on other grounds, Monnell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436
U.S. 658 (1978); Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 785 (1986) (White, J., dissenting)).
26. Id. at 704.
27. 519 A.2d 263 (N.H. 1986).
28. Id. at 266; see also Blue Jay Realty Trust v. City of Franklin, 567 A.2d 188,
194-95 (N.H. 1989) (holding that despite recent contrary dicta, the mandate of stare deci-
sis dictated that a prior ruling prevails).
29. For a discussion of the partisan politics and underlying issues involved in
Souter's nomination and confirmation hearings, see David K. Koehler, The Confirmation
of David H. Souter as an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court (1991)
(unpublished manuscript, on file at Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University); see
also supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
30. SENATE COM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 101ST CONG., 2D SESS., NOINATION OF DAVID
H. SOUTER TO BE AN ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, EX-
ECUTIVE REPORT 60 (Oct. 1, 1990) [hereinafter EXECUTIVE REPORT].
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conservative side of the aisle-of judges playing the role of "knight
errant," ruling as they see fit rather than within the dictates of the
law: "I share the demand that we look outside ourselves, the de-
mand that we guard against our views of morality or public policy,
however passionately we may hold them and however profound our
principles may be."3'
Souter indicated, however, that he was not blindly intractable
on the issue of stare decisis. Acknowledging that Brown v. Board of
Education32 was settled doctrine, Souter asserted that it was a valid
example of overturning precedent when dictated by societal change
and pragmatic theory. Souter stated explicitly that it is not the
principles that change, but the world around them: [Als I have said
before that I think Plessy was wrongly decided... I would like to
think, and I do believe, that the principle of equal protection was
there and that in the time intervening we have gotten better at see-
ing what is before our noses."3
Souter suggested that cases in the criminal context may be
more readily subject to review. He opined that certain cases in this
area34 are an exercise of the Court's "prudential power"-an attempt
"to get the right result, to enforce the appropriate standard with the
least amount of damage to the body politic.., and with the least
amount of damage to the judicial system, which is constantly over-
whelmed with litigation." 5 Souter did "not rule out the possibility of
[such issues] coming back before the Court":
I think what I can probably say to it is that-and I have said similar
things from the bench in New Hampshire-that if that issue does come
back or one similar to it, I think there is an obligation on those who want
to raise it to address the pragmatic issues. How is it working today? How
do we assess, if you say the price is high, how do we assess that price?
What do we really know about what is going on?
I think we are engaged in significant measure if such an issue comes
up in a very pragmatic weighing, and it must be addressed that way.
3 6
Souter asserted that although precedent was a threshold in-
quiry, if a case was found to be wrongly decided, one must evaluate
the "degree and kind" of reliance placed on the precedent by indi-
31. Id. at 55 (quoting Transcript, Sept. 14, 1990, at 6-7).
32. 347 U.S. 483 (1953).
33. ExEcuTIvE REPORT, supra note 30, at 12-13 (discussing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537 (1896)).
34. As an example, Souter cited Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
35. 16 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: HEARINGS AND REPORTS ON
SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL NOIINATIONS OF SUPREME COURT JUST7ICES BY THE
SENATE JUDICIARY COMITrEE 1916-1990 (DAVID H. SOUTER) 384 (Compiled by Roy M.




viduals, legislatures, and courts, as well as the hardship engendered
by overruling the case. 7 Souter elaborated:
If a precedent, in fact, is consistent with a line of development which
extends from its date to the present time, then the cost of overruling that
precedent is, of course, going to be enormously greater and enormously
different from what will be the case in instances in which the prior case
either has not been followed or the prior case has simply been eroded,
chipped away at, as we say, by later determinations. 38
He further noted that such reliance considerations are not limited to
the commercial context.3 9
When pressed to address the controversial issue of abortion and
its related precedents, Souter deftly and tenaciously exercised his
"prerogative" not to answer.40 He stated: "I have not any agenda on
what should be done with Roe v. Wade, if that case were brought be-
fore me. I will listen to both sides of that case. I have not made up
my mind and I do not go on the Court saying I must go one way or I
must go another way."41
Although Souter invoked his "prerogative" not to comment on
the "unsettled" issue of abortion, he did discuss the standard of re-
view in gender discrimination and free exercise cases as well as the
constitutionality of capital punishment, freedom of speech and
criminal procedure issues." Arguably, these issues were no more
settled than that of abortion. Similarly, Souter was willing to dis-
cuss his view of stare decisis regarding controversial First Amend-
ment Establishment Clause cases. Souter asserted that he did not
"have either an agenda or a personal desire" to bring about a reex-
amination of the Establishment Clause's "wall of separation" be-
tween church and state.43 He also noted that the three-part "Lemon
test," enunciated in Lemon v. Kurtzman,44 was problematic and
might bring the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses into con-
flict, but that he harbored no inclination to change the Court's
37. EXECUTIVE REPORT, supra note 30, at 36-37.
38. Id. at 37 (quoting Transcript, Sept. 13, 1990, at 137-38).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 21 (quoting Transcript, Sept. 13, 1990, at 117).
41. Id. at 22 (quoting Transcript, Sept. 27, 1990, at 129 (discussing Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973)).
42. See id. at90.
43. Id. at 32 (quoting Transcript, Sept. 17, 1990, at 27). The Court first addressed
the wall of separation doctrine in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
44. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). According to the Lemon Court, "[t]hree such tests may be
gleaned from our cases. First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second,
its principle or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; fi-
nally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive entanglement with religion.'" Id. at 612-
13 (citation omitted).
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ruling.4 5
The Senate confirmation hearings created an impression of
Souter as a jurist with great respect for precedent but also one will-
ing to address pragmatic considerations such as reliance in the
commercial context and to show less deference to precedent in the
criminal context. Although he gave the impression of respect for
constitutional precedent such as First Amendment doctrine, he
failed to comment on the politically charged issue of abortion and
the precedential value of Roe v. Wade. His statement that precedent
which has been "eroded" or "chipped away" might be ripe for recon-
sideration left the fate of decisions such as Roe, which had been un-
der siege for nineteen years, indeterminate.
I. FOUNDATIONS OF SOUTER'S EMERGENT
STARE DECISIS JURISPRUDENCE
After his first two terms on the nation's highest court, Justice
Souter was still considered something of a mystery.46 Inasmuch as
his first two Supreme Court terms produced a relatively modest
number of opinions,4 7 it may be too early to divine Souter's jurispru-
45. EXECUTIVE REPORT, supra note 30, at 32. Souter never decided a case involving
the issue of church-state relations while a judge in New Hampshire. DEREK DAVIS,
ORIGINAL INTENT: CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST AND THE COURSE OF AMERICAN
CHURCH/STATE RELATIONS 161 (1991) (citing Rob Boston, Is Souter Suitable?, 43 CHURCH
& ST. 4 (1990)).
46. See, e.g., Richard C. Reuben, Justice Souter's Rulings Add to Mystery, L-. DAILY
J., June 16, 1992, at 7.
47. During the 1990 term, the freshman Justice authored only 12 opinions-8 Court
opinions, 2 concurrences, and 2 dissents-which was significantly less than any other
member of the Court. By comparison, the Justice authoring the lowest number of total
opinions (opinions for the Court, concurrences, and dissents) other than Souter during the
1990 term was Justice Rehnquist with 19. Justices Stevens and Scalia wrote the highest
number of total opinions with 44 and 43 respectively. See The Supreme Court 1990 Term:
Leading Cases, 105 HARV. L. REV. 177,419 (1991).
Souter's diminutive first-term opinion writing has been attributed to a sense of be-
wilderment and poor chamber organization. Christopher E. Smith & Scott P. Johnson,
Newcomer on the High Court: Justice David Souter and the Supreme Court's 1990 Term,
37 S.D. L. REV. 21, 28 (1992) (citing Except on Law and Order, Souter Remains a Mystery,
N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1991, at E3); Souter: Slow Off the Mark, NEWSWEEK, May 27, 1991,
at 4; see also DAVID G. SAVAGE, TURNING RIGHT: THE MAKING OF THE REHNQUIST
SUPREME COURT 408 (1992).
There is also the possibility that the other Justices, uncertain of the newcomer's po-
sition and philosophy, were not inclined to assign Souter opinions significant in either
number or substance. See Smith & Johnson, supra at 32-33. Accordingly, when Souter
wrote for the Court during his freshman term, his opinions were often short and reflective
of both unanimity and discrete issues. See, e.g., Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.
Solimino, 501 U.S. 104 (1991); Yates v. Evatt, 501 U.S. 391 (1991); Ford v. Georgia, 498
U.S. 411 (1991). One might argue that Souter has not been given the opportunity to dis-
play his jurisprudential acumen. This theory, however, fails to account for his lack of con-
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dential approach in most areas. However, he has assumed a re-
markably definitive stance regarding the doctrine of stare decisis.
Souter articulated the foundational principles of an emergent
stare decisis jurisprudence during his first two terms on the United
States Supreme Court in James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia,48
Payne v. Tennessee, 4 and Lee v. Weisman. In Beam, Payne, and
Lee, Souter set forth three distinct contextual approaches to stare
decisis: commercial, criminal and constitutional. In each context, his
interpretation and application of the doctrine of stare decisis de-
pends upon the consequences of precedential reliance or non-
reliance.
A. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia
Souter announced the judgment of the Court in James B. Beam
Distilling Co. v. Georgia.5' The Beam Court considered whether its
prior ruling in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias"2 should apply retroac-
tively to litigants whose claims antedated that decision.13 In Bac-
chus, the Court held a tax distinguishing between imports and ex-
currences and dissents.
During the 1991 term, Souter authored 21 opinions-13 opinions for the Court, 5
concurrences, and 3 dissents. While this represents an increase over the number of opin-
ions in his 1990 term, it is still less than the number of opinions authored by the newly
appointed Justice Clarence Thomas.
This is not to imply that Souter's presence has not had a significant impact on the
Court. Indeed, his presence has had a particularly notable effect when the Court faced a
close vote. See Scott P. Johnson & Christopher E. Smith, David Souter's First Term on the
Supreme Court: The Impact of a New Justice, 75 JUDIcATURE 238 (1992) (noting that
Souter's presence was especially apparent in criminal cases). Souter voted with the ma-
jority in 14 of 21 five-four decisions during the 1990 term and in 13 of the 14 five-four de-
cisions of the 1991 term, which was more than any other Justice. Marcia Coyle, New Trio
Stands up to Court's Hard Right, NA'L L. J., Aug. 31, 1992, at S1-S2. In many of these
cases, it is quite likely that Justice Brennan-Souter's predecessor-would have voted dif-
ferently. In- only two of the five-four decisions of the 1990 term did Souter add a fifth vote
to a Marshall-Blackmun majority-an alignment which traditionally would have given
Brennan a majority.
The 1991 term also found Souter in the majority in 100 out of 108 decisions, which
prompted one commentator to remark that "to find out where the Supreme Court is, look
for David Souter." Linda Greenhouse, Souter Anchoring the Court's New Center, N.Y.
TIMES, July 3, 1992, at Al.
48. 501 U.S. 529 (1991).
49. 501 U.S. 808, 835 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring).
50. 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2667 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring).
51. 501 U.S. 529 (1991). While Souter wrote for the Court, his opinion was joined
only by Justice Stevens. To establish a majority, Justices White, Blackmun, Marshall and
Scalia joined only in the judgment.
52. 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
53. Beam, 501 U.S. at 532.
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ports unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause.' Therefore, a
state could not tax out-of-state companies that imported products
differently than it taxed in-state companies. In response to the deci-
sion in Bacchus, James Beam Distilling Co., a Kentucky bourbon
manufacturer, sued Georgia to recover excessive import taxes paid
under Georgia state law. 5
Souter invoked stare decisis to hold that the decision in Bac-
chus applied retroactively. 6 A contrary holding would breach "the
principle that litigants in similar situations should be treated the
same, a fundamental component of stare decisis and the rule of law
generally."5 7 Souter reasoned that a court must consider "the equi-
table and reliance interests of parties absent but similarly situ-
ated."58 He concluded: "The applicability of rules of law are [sic] not
to be switched on and off according to individual hardship; allowing
relitigation... would only compound the challenge to the stabilizing
purpose of precedent posed in the first instance by the very devel-
opment of 'new' rules."59
B. Payne v. Tennessee
Unlike Souter's invocation of stare decisis as settled law in
Beam, the Court in Payne v. Tennessee60 was unwilling to rely on
54. Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 273.
55. Beam, 501 U.S. at 533. Since Georgia amended its excise tax in 1985 to reflect
the Bacchus holding, petitioner sought a refund of 2.4 million dollars for the years 1982,
1983 and 1984. Id. at 532-33.
56. Id. at 532. Souter held that modified or selective prospectivity was impermissi-
ble. Id. at 535-42. Quoting Justice Harlan, Souter argued that modified prospectivity is
"[slimply fishing one case from the stream of appellate review, using it as a vehicle for
pronouncing new constitutional standards, and then permitting a stream of similar cases
to flow by unaffected by that new rule." Id. at 541-42 (quoting Mackey v. United States,
401 U.S. 667, 679 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part)).
57. Id. at 537 (citing RICHARD A. WASSERSTROM, THE JUDIcIAL DECISION: TOWARD A
THEORY OF LEGAL JUSTIFICATION 69-72 (1961)).
58. Id. at 543; see also id. at 540 (discussing Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314
(1987), and citing United States v. Estate of Donnelly, 397 U.S. 286, 296 (1970) (Harlan,
J., concurring)).
59. Id. at 543.
60. 501 U.S. 808 (1991). The petitioner, Pervis Tyrone Payne, was convicted of two
counts of first-degree murder for violently stabbing Charisse Christopher, a 28 year-old
divorced mother, and her two-year-old daughter after the woman rejected his sexual ad-
vances. Payne was also charged with first-degree assault with intent to murder Christo-
pher's three-year-old son, who managed to survive multiple knife wounds that fully pene-
trated his body. During the sentencing phase of his trial, the defense brought witnesses to
testify to mitigating circumstances such as Payne's church attendance, slight mental re-
tardation and previous good behavior. The prosecution brought the surviving child's
grandmother who testified to the impact on the child who cried for the victims and did not
understand why they did not come home. In arguing for the death penalty, the prosecutor
870 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42
precedent. The Court held that the admission of victim impact evi-
dence 1 during the sentencing phase of a capital trial was not barred
by the Eighth Amendment.62 In so ruling, the Court reconsidered
and overruled its recent holdings in Booth v. Maryland63 and South
Carolina v. Gathers.I Although the Payne majority acknowledged
the importance of stare decisis,6 5 it found Booth and Gathers badly
reasoned and unworkable. 6
Souter's concurrence cautioned that overruling precedent based
stressed the effects of the crime upon the victims' family and asked the jury to consider
how to answer the child when he grows up and asks ifjustice was done. The jury returned
a sentence of death. Id. at 810-16.
61. Victim impact evidence refers to the admission of evidence regarding the effects
that a crime has upon the victim or individuals close to the victim. Although such evi-
dence does not determine the blameworthiness of a particular defendant, it is designed to
portray an actual assessment of the harm caused by the crime for the sentencing author-
ity. See id. at 817-24.
62. Id. at 811. The Eighth Amendment reads: "Excessive ball shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII.
63. 482 U.S. 496 (1987) (holding that survivor victim impact statements were irrele-
vant to defendant's blameworthiness and therefore contrary to Eighth Amendment).
64. 490 U.S. 805 (1989) (holding that prosecutor's description of victim's traits was
indistinguishable from victim impact statements found inadmissible in Booth).
Booth and Gathers were decided, respectively, four and two terms prior to Payne.
Subsequent to the decision in Booth, the composition of the Court changed with the addi-
tion of two new members, Justices Kennedy and Souter. Kennedy and Souter voted with
the majority in Payne, which was otherwise comprised of the dissenters from both Booth
and Gathers. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 850 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("It takes little real de-
tective work to discern what has changed since this Court decided Booth and Gathers:
this Court's own personnel.").
65. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged:
Stare decisis is the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, pre-
dictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on ju-
dicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the ju-
dicial process. Adhering to precedent "is usually the wise policy, because in most
matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than it be
settled right."
Payne, 501 U.S. at 827 (citations omitted).
66. Id. at 811, 827-30. Chief Justice Rehnquist laid out the general principles that
had allowed the Court to overrule 33 constitutional decisions during the last 20 terms:
Nevertheless, when governing decisions are unworkable or are badly reasoned,
"this Court has never felt constrained to follow precedent." Stare decisis is not
an inexorable command; rather it "is a principle of policy and not a mechanical
formula of adherence to the latest decision." This is particularly true in consti-
tutional cases, because in such cases "correction through legislative action is
practically impossible." Considerations in favor of stare decisis are at their acme
in cases involving property and contract rights, where reliance interests are in-
volved, the opposite is true in cases such as the present one involving proce-
dural and evidentiary rules.
Id. at 827-28 (citations omitted).
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on constitutional error must be done "with painstaking care." 67 Nev-
ertheless, Souter justified overruling Booth and Gathers because
they failed to reveal the victim's individuality and the consequent
impact of the crime on survivors.68 According to Souter, murder has
"foreseeable consequences" to "distinct" or "unique" individuals as
well as the victims left behind.6 9 Since the consequences to the vic-
tim and survivors are foreseeable, evidence concerning the impact of
the crime is necessarily "imbue[d] with direct moral relevance." 0
Souter reasoned that there should be no bar to the admission of such
evidence because "criminal conduct has traditionally been catego-
rized and penalized differently according to consequences not spe-
cifically intended, but determined in part by conditions unknown to
a defendant when he acted."71 Accordingly, he concluded that the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment
would not require the exclusion of victim impact evidence, even in
the unique circumstances of a capital sentencing hearing.72
Coupled with the constitutional error justification, Souter de-
fended overruling Booth because it "sets an unworkable standard of
constitutional relevance that threatens, on its own terms, to produce
such arbitrary consequences and uncertainty of application as vir-
tually to guarantee a result far diminished from the case's promise
of appropriately individualized sentencing for capital defendants."
7 3
According to Souter, prohibiting the admission of victim impact evi-
dence during the sentencing phase of a capital trial was unworkable
because particulars about the impact of the crime on the victim and
survivors would have been admitted previously during the guilt
phase of the trial.74 Nothing short of two separate juries would pre-
vent the evidence presented during the guilt phase from being con-
67. Id. at 837 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 785
(1987)).
68. Id. at 835.
69. Id. at 838.
70. Id.
71. Id. Souter wrote that a murderer must take responsibility for the inevitable con-
sequences of his acts:
Thus, when a defendant chooses to kill, or to raise the risk of a victim's death,
this choice necessarily relates to a whole human being and threatens an asso-
ciation of others, who may be distinctly hurt. The fact that the defendant may
not know the details of a victim's life and characteristics, or the exact identities
and needs of those who may survive, should not in any way obscure the further
facts that death is always to a "unique" individual, and harm to some group of
survivors is a consequence of a successful homicidal act so foreseeable as to be
virtually inevitable.
Id.
72. Id. at 837.
73. Id. (citing Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 502 (1989)).
74. Id. at 839-40.
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sidered at the sentencing phase.75 Thus, the precedent "raise[d] a
dilemma with very practical consequences." 6
Despite Souter's recognition that overruling precedent "is a
matter of no small import, for the 'doctrine of stare decisis is of fun-
damental importance to the rule of law,' "7 he maintained that in
prior cases, when faced with a wrongly decided or unworkable
precedent, the Court has "chosen not to compound the original error,
but to overrule the precedent.7 8 Further, Souter noted that stare
decisis is not an "inexorable command,"79 and it has not been applied
rigidly by the Court in constitutional cases."0 Instead, stare decisis
has always been applied with the caveat that a departure from the
persuasive force of precedent requires only the support of some
"special justification."8 '
C. Lee v. Weisman
In Lee v. Weisman,2 Souter once again faced the proposition of
overruling constitutional precedent. Lee concerned the constitu-
tionality of invocations and benedictions at public high school
graduation ceremonies. The Court held that the Establishment
Clause prohibited state-sponsored prayer in public schools. 3
Souter joined "the whole of the Court's opinion" but wrote sepa-
rately to address the issues of "whether the [Establishment] Clause
applies to governmental practices that do not favor one religion or
75. Souter commented: "This would be a major imposition on the States, however,
and I suppose that no one would seriously consider adding such a further requirement."
Id. at 841.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 842 (quoting Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways and Pub. Transp., 483 U.S.
468, 494 (1987)).
78. Id. at 843 (citing Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989);
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); Swift & Co. v. Wickham,
382 U.S. 111 (1965)).
79. Id. at 842 (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
80. Id. (citing Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1989); Glid-
den Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 543 (1962); Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S.
393, 405 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
81. Id. (citing Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984)).
82. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
83. Id. at 2661. Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court:
The sole question presented is whether a religious exercise may by conducted at
a graduation ceremony in circumstances where, as we have found, young
graduates who object are induced to conform. No holding by this Court suggests
that a school can persuade or compel a student to participate in a religious ex-
ercise. That is being done here, and it is forbidden by the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment.
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denomination over others, and whether state coercion of religious
conformity, over and above state endorsement of religious exercise
or belief, is a necessary element of an Establishment Clause viola-
tion."84 He found that both issues could not be considered constitu-
tionally permissible in light of long-standing precedent.
Invoking stare decisis, Souter applied Everson v. Board of Edu-
cation,85 a forty-five year-old "principle of constitutional law from
which [the Court] has not strayed," which prohibited state practices
that aid any or all religions. 6 He wrote: "In barring the State from
sponsoring generically Theistic prayers where it could not sponsor
sectarian ones, we hold true to a line of precedent from which there
is no adequate historical case to depart."" Accordingly, Souter con-
cluded that the Court should "stick to [settled law] absent some
compelling reason to discard it."88
Souter rejected the majority's assertion that state coercion is a
necessary element of an Establishment Clause violation, since there
was no compelling reason to refashion the settled Establishment
Clause doctrine. 9 Souter acknowledged that the Court's precedents
"may not always have drawn perfectly straight lines. They simply
cannot, however, support the position that a showing of coercion is
necessary to a successful Establishment Clause claim."" Addition-
84. Id. at 2667.
85. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
86. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2667.
87. Id. Souter lends support to this argument by discussing a number of cases. Id. at
2667-68 (citing Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 17 (1989) (striking down tax
exemption benefit specifically for religious periodicals as effectively endorsing religious
beliefs); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 57 (1985) (finding that a moment-of-silence stat-
ute passed for the sole purpose of returning voluntary prayer to public schools even with-
out encouraging students to pray violated the Establishment Clause); Epperson v. Arkan-
sas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (holding that the First Amendment mandates neutrality be-
tween religions "and between religion and non-religion"); School Dist. of Abington v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 216 (1963) (finding that the Establishment Clause does not apply
only between religions); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962) (holding that public
schools may not subject students to the reading of any prayer, however "denominationally
neutral"); Torasco v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 489 (1961) (striking down a state constitu-
tional provision which required public officials to state a "belief in the existence of God")).
88. Id. at 2668 (citing Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 836 (1991) (Souter, J., con-
curring); Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984)). Presumably, by citing his opinion
in Payne, Souter now construed Payne's unworkable criteria or special justification as a
"compelling reason" test.
89. Souter's approach was true to his Senate confirmation hearing testimony that,
although problematic, he did not think it necessary to reexamine the Court's Establish-
ment Clause jurisprudence. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
90. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2672. Souter compared those cases in which the Court struck
down coercive acts, Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989); Wallace v. Jaffree,
472 U.S. 38 (1985), with those cases in which the Court struck down acts where there was
no apparent coercion, Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (plurality opin-
874 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42
ally, Souter explained, from a pragmatic standpoint, questions of
"comparative theology" were not "amenable to the competence of the
federal judiciary," and should be "deliberately... avoided where
possible."91
D. Nexus of Beam, Payne, and Lee-Souter's Pragmatic Subtext
The principles articulated in Beam, Payne, and Lee highlight
Souter's approach to stare decisis. In Beam, Souter made clear his
intent to follow precedent in the commercial context where the im-
portance of reliance is stressed.92 In Payne, Souter took a much more
cavalier approach to precedent in the criminal context and was
therefore more amenable to overruling precedent in such cases.93
Despite the Court's more lenient practice of overruling constitu-
tional cases,s4 Souter adhered to precedent in Lee since he found no
compelling reason to alter prior Establishment Clause jurispru-
ion); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473
U.S. 373 (1985); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962).
Although the Court has not officially established a "coercion test" per se, such an
approach appears to be the current direction in which the Court is moving. See Kristin J.
Graham, Comment, The Supreme Court Comes Full Circle: Coercion as the Touchstone of
an Establishment Clause Violation, 42 BuFF. L. REv. 147 (1994).
91. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2671.
92. This stance reflects the Court's general disposition favoring precedent in the
commercial context. Chief Justice Rehnquist has written for the Court: "Considerations in
favor of stare decisis are at their acme in cases involving property and contract rights,
where reliance interests are involved." Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991)
(citing Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363 (1977);
Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 116 (1965); Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285
U.S. 393, 405-11 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); United States v. Title Ins. Co., 265 U.S.
472 (1924); The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 12 U.S. (How.) 443, 458 (1852)).
93. Souter's cavalier approach to precedent in criminal cases is also apparent in
Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624 (1991). In Schad, Souter wrote for the Court regarding
Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980), which held that a state statute prohibiting lesser
included offense instructions in capital cases is unconstitutional. Souter held that the
statute was not applicable because the jury had the opportunity to convict of second de-
gree murder even though the lesser included offense of robbery was not included as re-
quested by defense counsel. Schad, 501 U.S. at 645-48. Despite Justice White's dissent
that the precedent in Beck wasn't satisfied, id. at 660 (White, J., dissenting), Souter
opined that the "[pletitioner misapprehends the conceptual underpinnings of Beck." Id. at
646. In Schad, Souter's conception of the Constitution was displayed as a flexible set of
evolutionary principles: "[H]istory and current practice are significant indicators of what
we as a people regard as fundamentally fair," but criminal holdings are "always open to
critical examination." Id. at 643.
94. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 828 n.1 (1991) (citing 33 constitutional decisions over-
ruled in part or whole during the past 20 years); Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285
U.S. 393, 406-08 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (indicating that the Court's power to
overrule constitutional precedent is vested in the practical impossibility of correction by
the legislature, and citing many cases to that effect).
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dence.
Although arriving at seemingly contradictory results, Souter
applied an approach similar to what he called "pragmatic weighing"
at his confirmation hearings. 5 The difference in outcome of these
cases depended upon the context in which they arose. The criminal
context, as Souter indicated at his confirmation hearings, 6 was an
area more ripe for review than the statutory or constitutional con-
text. If he had implemented Payne's unworkable test against the
need for retroactive application in Beam or the difficulty of the
courts applying the Lemon test's secular purpose prong in Lee, the
outcome in those cases could have been quite different.
In Beam, Payne, and Lee, Souter cloaked himself in the mantle
of a pragmatist, paying consideration to outcomes and effects when
applying the doctrine of stare decisis.97 The protean nature of
Souter's application did not reflect the inherent or relative worth of
following or rejecting precedent, but rather reflected the conse-
quences and practicality of decisions. Although Souter ostensibly
discussed stare decisis in each of the three cases, the subtext of his
dialogue was driven by pragmatic policy considerations: the harm to
business reliance in Beam; the impact on survivors and the difficulty
of administering two trials in Payne; and the inability of judges to
become engaged and mired in comparative theology in Lee. In short,
depending upon whether a particular decision and course of action
was desirable or undesirable, Souter either applied or distinguished
stare decisis to justify the desired result.
I. THE SYNTHESIS OF SOUTER'S STARE DECISIS
INTERPRETATION IN CASEY
Souter synthesized the approaches taken in Beam, Payne, and
Lee to articulate his most explicit stance on the doctrine of stare de-
cisis in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.9" The decision was announced
during the waning days of Souter's second term and, given the con-
troversial issue of abortion, it came as no surprise that Casey caused
the greatest stir of the 1991 term.' Justices O'Connor, Kennedy,
95. See supra text accompanying note 36.
96. See supra text accompanying notes 34-36.
97. Beyond the context of stare decisis, this pragmatism was also evident in Souter's
earlier opinions on the Court. See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 581-87
(1991) (Souter, J., concurring) (distancing himself from the majority's focus on the per se
morality of topless dancing while focusing on the effects of such establishments upon the
community).
98. 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2808-16 (1992).
99. See, e.g., Marcia Coyle, Court Confounds Observers, NAT'L L. J., July 13, 1992, at
1. The day before Casey was handed down, Souter reportedly telephoned a friend in New
Hampshire: "I think my name may be in the paper after tomorrow." Paul M. Barret, In-
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and Souter-the newly dubbed "centrist" voting block"0 -- jointly
authored the opinion'01 which, much to the nation's surprise,"°2 reaf-
dependent Justice, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 1993, at Al, A6.
100. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Again, a Struggle for the Soul of the Court, N.Y.
TImES, July 8, 1992, at A19; Coyle, supra note 47, at Si; The High and Middle Ground,
ECoNOmiST, July 4, 1992, at 49.
It is interesting to note that when Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter voted to-
gether during the 1991 term, they were not on the losing side of any case. Linda Green-
house, High Court Begins Today With Focus on New Coalition, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1992,
at Al. The three Justices voted together 71% of the time. Other Supreme Court News:
Centrist Bloc Slows Conservative Trend, FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIG., July 9, 1992,
at 505, B2.
101. It is a rare and dramatic event when more than one justice signs an opinion.
Generally, a number ofjustices will do so in an attempt to add an air of legitimacy or at
least make clear that the statement being made is meant to be emphatic. See, e.g., Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, Stevens, JJ.) (reinstating
Georgia's amended death penalty statute as not necessarily violative of the Eighth or
Fourteenth Amendment); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (opinion of Warren, C.J.,
Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, Burton, Clark, Harlan, Brennan, Whittaker, JJ.) (enforcing
desegregation and asserting the duty of a state to follow federal court orders); see also Re-
gents of Univ. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun,
JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that although racial classification
calls for strict scrutiny, the importance of minority underrepresentation allows race to be
used as a factor in university admission).
The joint opinion in Casey ostensibly made a bold statement to lead the Court out of
the abortion controversy by supporting the "essential" holding of Roe on the grounds of
stare decisis. Alternatively, the dissent in Casey would argue that the joint opinion was
an attempt to legitimize the alteration of precedent. It is also quite possible, however,
that the joint writing of the Casey opinion was not merely to emphasize the import of the
decision, but a practical reflection of the difficulty in producing a lengthy opinion during
the busiest part of the term with only nine weeks between oral argument and the issu-
ance of the decision. In an attempt to put the abortion issue to rest, the opinion may have
been divided to assure the strength of its reasoning and analysis.
102. At the beginning of the 1991 term, Justice Blackmun observed that "It]he votes
[were] there" to overturn Roe; he added playfully: "If I had any sense, I'd quit, but it's
rather fun to sit in the middle of this and see what happens." Outlook: People, U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REP., Nov. 4, 1991, at 25.
Although President Bush had hoped to find a justice who was willing to overturn
Roe, Souter appears to be independent of Bush's ideology. In response to Casey, Bush
said: "I was telling the truth-that there was no litmus test on [abortion]." Greenhouse,
supra note 47, at A16. One commentator noted:
What has really happened is this. Judges like Justice Souter have tired of being
told to act like politicians and have started to act like judges. And therein lies a
delicious irony. For when George Bush appointed Justice Souter that was, he
said, exactly how he wanted judges to behave.
Justice Souter, Out From the Egg, ECONOMIsT, July 4, 1992, at 30.
Other presidents have reportedly been surprised by the opinions of their appointees
after taking the bench. For example, Dwight D. Eisenhower was surprised by Chief Jus-
tice Earl Warren and Justice William Brennan, while Richard M. Nixon was surprised by
Justice Harry T. Blackmun. See, e.g., HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A
POLITICAL HISTORY OF APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT 258, 306-10 (3rd ed. 1992)
(discussing the surprises of Warren and Blackmun); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS
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firmed the "essential holding"'03 of Roe v. Wade0 4 Although the
opinion was jointly authored, Justice Souter read the section that he
wrote addressing stare decisis from the bench. 0 5
A. Exposition
In Casey, clinics and physicians brought a due process claim to
challenge the constitutionality of five provisions of the Pennsylvania
Abortion Control Act of 1982.106 The provisions required: informed
consent within twenty-four hours prior to an abortion procedure; pa-
rental consent for minors; spousal consent for married women; facil-
ity reporting requirements; and an exception to these three forms of
consent in the case of a medical emergency. 07
The District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania de-
termined that these provisions were unconstitutional. 0 8 The Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, upholding the constitu-
tionality of all the provisions except the spousal notification re-
quirement. 09 The Supreme Court granted certiorari,"0 finding it
HONORABLE COURT 51 (1985) (recounting how President Eisenhower, when asked if he
had made any mistakes during his presidency, replied: "Yes, two, and they are both sit-
ting on the Supreme Court.").
103. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2804.
104. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
105. Linda Greenhouse, A Telling Court Opinion; The Ruling's Words Are About
Abortion, But They Reveal Much About Authors, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1992, at Al. Al-
though the opinion was jointly authored, for the purposes of this Comment, those portions
of the joint opinion dealing with stare decisis will be attributed specifically to Souter.
106. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3203-3220 (1990).
107. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2803. The joint opinion discussed these restrictive provi-
sions:
The Act requires that a woman seeking an abortion give her informed consent
prior to the abortion procedure, and specifies that she be provided with certain
information at least 24 hours before the abortion is performed. § 3205. For a
minor to obtain an abortion, the Act requires the informed consent of one of her
parents, but provides for a judicial bypass option if the minor does not wish to or
cannot obtain a parent's consent. § 3206. Another provision of the Act requires
that, unless certain exceptions apply, a married woman seeking an abortion
must sign a statement indicating that she has notified her husband of her in-
tended abortion. § 3209. The Act exempts compliance with these three require-
ments in the event of a "medical emergency," which is defined in § 3203 of the
Act. See §§ 3203, 3205(a), 3206(a), 3209(c). In addition to the above provisions
regulating the performance of abortions, the Act imposes certain reporting re-
quirements on facilities that provide abortion services. §§ 3207(b), 3214(a),
3214(f).
Id. (internal citations to 18 PA. CONS. STAT. (1990)).
108. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323 (E.D. Pa. 1990), affd in part
and rev'd in part, 947 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991), affd in part and rev'd in part, 112 S. Ct.
2791 (1992).
109. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991), affd in part and
rev'd in part, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
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"imperative to review once more the principles that define the rights
of the woman and the legitimate authority of the State respecting
the termination of the pregnancies by abortion procedures" and to
provide needed guidance to "[s]tates and federal courts as well as
legislatures throughout the Union... as they seek to address this
subject in conformance with the Constitution.""'
Despite the dissent's vehement argument that "Roe was
wrongly decided, and that it can and should be overruled consistent
with [the Court's] traditional approach to stare decisis in constitu-
tional cases,"" the majority affirmed the "essential holding" of
Roe."' The joint opinion described Roe's "essential holding" as con-
sisting of three parts:
First is a recognition of the right of the woman to chose to have an abor-
tion before viability and to obtain it without undue influence from the
State.... Second is a confirmation of the State's power to restrict abor-
tions after fetal viability, if the law contains exceptions for pregnancies
which endanger a woman's life or health. And third is the principle that
the State has legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in pro-
tecting the health of the woman and the life of the fetus that may become
a child." 4
The joint opinion concluded: "These principles do not contradict one
another; and we adhere to each." 5
Applying an "undue burden" test,116 the Court held that abor-
tions prior to viability could not be criminalized nor could spousal
consent be required.1 7 The Court, however, did uphold provisions
requiring parental consent for minors, a twenty-four hour waiting
period, and informed consent.18 Additionally, the Court rejected the
110. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 931 (1992).
111. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2804 (1992).
112. Id. at 2855 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part) (discussing the Court's greater propensity to overrule constitutional cases).
113. Id. at 2804.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. 'Only where state regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman's ability to
make this decision [to have an abortion] does the power of the State reach into the heart
of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause." Id. at 2819.
The "undue burden" test was formally articulated in a dissent written by Justice
O'Connor in City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 452-66 (1983)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). Subsequently, this test was elaborated by Justice O'Connor's
dissent in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747, 828 (1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). According to Justice O'Connor: "[Jiudicial
scrutiny of State regulation of abortion should be limited to whether the State law bears a
rational relationship to legitimate purposes... with heightened scrutiny reserved for in-
stances in which the State has imposed an 'undue burden' on the abortion decision." Id.
117. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2826-31.
118. Id. at 2822-26, 2832.
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argument that the medical emergency exemption was too narrowly
construed and ruled that the clinic recordkeeping and reporting re-
quirements were constitutionally permissible."' Despite the fact
that it was affirming and overruling simultaneously, the joint opin-
ion focused on stare decisis as its justification.
B. Stare Decisis
The joint opinion opened with the ringing, almost axiomatic,
phrase: "Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt."20
Souter hinged the legal underpinnings for such an "august and so-
norous "121 assertion upon the doctrine of stare decisis and the value
of precedent. 22 According to Souter, "the very concept of the rule of
law underlying our own Constitution requires such continuity over
time that a respect for precedent is by definition indispensable."23
Souter also acknowledged a contrary limiting necessity not to
follow a prior ruling which is clearly in error. 124 To this end, he de-
tailed "prudential and pragmatic considerations designed to test the
consistency of overruling a prior decision with the ideal of the rule of
law, and to gauge the respective costs of reaffirming or overruling a
prior case. " ' The test consists of three prongs which respectively
reflect the rationales of Beam, Payne, and Lee: 26 whether the rule
has engendered reliance such that overruling would create inequity
and undue hardship;12 whether the rule has proven unworkable;' 28
and whether there was an evolution or development of legal princi-
ple so as to render the original rule insignificant or "a doctrinal
anachronism discounted by society." 9
Applying this test to the facts in Casey, Souter concluded that
the essential holding of Roe survived each criteria. First, Souter ad-
vanced a reliance argument in favor of abortion by asserting "that
for two decades of economic and social developments, people have
119. Id. at 2822, 2832-33.
120. Id. at 2803.
121. Id. at 2876 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
122. Id. at 2808-16.
123. Id. at 2808.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 2808-09; see supra part II.
127. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2808 (citing United States v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 265
U.S. 472, 486 (1924)); see discussion of Beam, supra part IIH.A
128. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2808 (citing Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 116
(1965)); see discussion of Payne, supra part II.B.
129. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2808-09 (citing Patterson v. McClean Credit Union, 491
U.S. 164, 173-74 (1989); Burnett v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 412 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)); see discussion of Lee, supra part II.C.
1994] 879
880 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42
organized intimate relationships and made choices that define their
views of themselves and their places in society, in reliance on the
availability of abortion in the event that contraception should
fail."130 This reliance has enabled and facilitated the ability of
women to "participate equally in the economic and social life of the
Nation."131 Second, Souter indicated that "[allthough Roe has engen-
dered opposition, it has in no sense proven 'unworkable,' "132 even
though there still might be a necessity for ongoing judicial review of
state laws. 133 Finally, Souter found neither an evolution of legal
principles undermining the foundation of Roe, 34 nor a disturbance of
Roe's liberty interest framework by subsequent decisions. 13 5
Although Roe satisfied the three prongs of his precedential in-
quiry, Souter asserted that the "sustained and widespread debate"
engendered by the decision called for an additional level of analy-
sis.136 Souter asserted that the "dimension" of Roe's controversy
could be likened to only two other decisional lines from the past
century-37 -decisional lines culminating with the overturning of
precedent in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parish13 and Brown v. Board of
Education.3 9 Souter distinguished these cases from Roe as resting
"on facts, or an understanding of facts, changed from those which
furnished the claimed justifications for the earlier constitutional
resolutions."'4 ° In Casey, Souter found no such change in the factual
situation and therefore no occasion to overrule Roe. He further indi-
130. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2809.
131. Id. (citing ROSALIND P. PETCHESKY, ABORTION AND WOM1AN'S CHOICE: THE
STATE, SEXUALITY, AND REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM 109, 133 n.7 (1990)).
132. Id. (citing Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546
(1985)).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 2810.
135. Id. at 2810-11 (citations omitted).
136. Id. at 2812.
137. Id. at 2812-13.
138. 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (explicitly overruling Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S.
525 (1923), and effectively overruling Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)). The
Court's decisions in Lochner and Adkins protected the contractual freedom and economic
autonomy of individual employees from the efforts of the states to impose human welfare
regulations. Fourteen years later, the Court in West Coast Hotel overruled Adkins, thus
signaling the internment of Lochner as well. The West Coast Hotel Court held that free-
dom to contract and economic autonomy were to be subordinate considerations to the
state's efforts to legislate health and welfare standards. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2812.
139. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (overruling Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)). The
Court in Brown considered racial segregation in the realm of public education. This re-
quired the Court to directly reconsider Plessy, which held that racial segregation in public
transportation did not constitute a denial of equal protection under the "separate but
equal" maxim. Fifty-eight years later, the Brown Court definitively overruled Plessy,
holding that separate but equal produced results that were inherently unequal.
140. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2813.
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cated "that a decision to overrule should rest on some special reason
over and above the belief that a prior case was wrongly decided."' 4'
C. Consequences
In Casey, Souter noted that "[albortion is a unique act....
fraught with consequences for others."' The most detrimental con-
sequence of overruling Roe would be to women who have relied on
its protection of their liberty interest in terminating pregnancies.
Such an infringement on reproductive freedom, Souter feared, would
curtail a woman's ability to participate fully and equally in economic
and social life. 43 He concluded: "The Constitution serves human
values, and while the effect of reliance in Roe cannot be exactly
measured, neither can the certain cost of overruling Roe for people
who have ordered their thinking and living around that case be
dismissed." 1
In considering the alternative, Souter's hypothesis took an Or-
wellian tone:
If indeed the woman's interest in deciding whether to bear and beget a
child had not been recognized as in Roe, the State might as readily restrict
a woman's right to choose to carry a pregnancy to term as to terminate it,
to further asserted state interests in population control, or eugenics, for
example. 145
Souter further evidenced his apprehension over the uncertain con-
sequences of overruling Roe when he questioned Solicitor General
Kenneth Starr during the April 22, 1992, oral argument in Casey:
"You're asking the Court to adopt a standard [by overruling Roe],
and I think we ought to know where the standard would take us." 4 6
The consequences of overruling Roe are not limited to those
who rely on it for constitutional protection, but also extend to the
legitimacy of the Court itself. In his final and most passionate ar-
gument, Souter concluded that "to overrule under fire in the absence
of the most compelling reason to reexamine a watershed decision
would subvert the Court's legitimacy beyond any serious ques-
tion." 47 To overrule Roe without such a weighty reason not only
141. Id. at 2814 (citing Mitchell v. W.T. Grant, 416 U.S. 600, 636 (1974) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 677 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
142. Id. at 2807.
143. Id. at 2809.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 2811 (citations omitted) (citing examples wherein Roe was implemented
to stem infringements on reproductive freedom).
146. Linda Greenhouse, Slim Margin; Moderates on Court Defy Prediction, N.Y.
TIMES, July 5, 1992, § 4, at 1.
147. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2815.
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would damage the Court's legitimacy, but would be "at the cost of
both profound and unnecessary damage... to the Nation's commit-
ment to the rule of law."14 Souter reasoned that both the legitimacy
and integrity of the Court were founded upon remaining steadfast to
precedent; the frequency of the Court's vacillation would fade this
standing and run afoul of the rule of law.'
Despite Souter's apparent reverence for stare decisis, the true
consequence of Casey was that it ultimately overruled Thornburgh
v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists,150 in part, by
upholding a requirement that information dissuading a pregnant
woman from having an abortion must be provided 5' and by permit-
ting clinics to keep detailed patient records." 2 Casey also overruled
City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,5 3 in part, by
requiring that a doctor, rather than a counselor, provide information
to pregnant women seeking abortions,'1 and by requiring a twenty-
four hour waiting period before an abortion could be performed. 5'
Apparently, Thornburgh and Akron were based on portions of Roe
that were not preserved by Souter's version of stare decisis. '
Similarly, in contravention of its stare decisis rhetoric, the joint
opinion scuttled the trimester framework as not a part of Roe's es-
sential holding because "in practice it undervalues the State's inter-
est in potential life."157 Further, although the joint opinion recog-
nized a woman's liberty interest over her body, strict scrutiny review
was supplanted with an undue burden test.5 ' Since the liberty in-
148. Id. at 2816.
149. Id. at 2814-15. Souter further extended this legitimacy to the Nation: "If the
Court's legitimacy should be undermined, then, so would the country be in its very ability
to see itself through its constitutional ideals. The Court's concern with legitimacy is not
for the sake of the Court but for the sake of the Nation to which it is responsible." Id. at
2816.
150. 476 U.S. 747, 759-68 (1986) (holding, inter alia, that material provided by the
state in an attempt to discourage abortion contravenes the privacy of the informed con-
sent discussion between the woman and her physician, and that detailed reporting re-
quirements are contrary to personal privacy rights and could possibly expose women to
public harassment).
151. Id. at 759-65.
152. Id. at 765-68.
153. 462 U.S. 416, 428, 446-51 (1983) (holding, inter alia, that it is unreasonable to
mandate that a patient's attending physician is the only individual competent to provide
information relevant to informed consent and that Akron failed to demonstrate any le-
gitimate state interest in an arbitrary and inflexible waiting period).
154. Id. at 446-49.
155. Id. at 449-51.
156. It is interesting to note that the partial overruling of Thornburgh and Akron
was not mentioned in the section of the joint opinion written by Souter concerning stare
decisis.
157. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2818 (1992).
158. Id. at 2820-21; see supra note 116 and accompanying text.
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terest established in Roe no longer requires strict scrutiny, it can no
longer be considered a fundamental right. Consequently, although
Roe was not technically overturned, very little of what remains after
Casey resembles the original holding.
IV. THE RULE OF LAW AS THE LAW OF CONSEQUENCES
Although steeped in empathetic rhetoric concerning a woman's
liberty over her body and "the right to define one's own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human
life,"'19 the joint opinion in Casey was scant on legal substance, save
Souter's section addressing stare decisis. Therein, Souter's almost
evangelical stance and rhetorical flourishes of "legitimacy" and the
"rule of law" belie the actions taken by the Court, which while
"purporting to adhere to precedent," instead significantly revised
it.160 In reality, Souter resorted to the neutral rhetoric of stare decisis
to disguise his own value judgments and acknowledgment of social
pressure.
A. The Law of Consequences
Souter's concern for the "rule of law" is balanced by his concern
for consequences. The joint opinion in Casey referred to the "rule of
law" nine times; six of these references were made by Souter.
161
However, despite the frequency of reference, one is never enlight-
159. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2807.
160. See id. at 2860 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dis-
senting in part). Chief Justice Rehnquist sardonically noted: "Roe continues to exist, but
only in the way a storefront on a western movie exists." Id.
161. Souter referred to the "rule of law" in the following instances:
"Indeed, the very concept of the rule of law underlying our own Constitution requires
such continuity over time that a respect for precedent is, by definition, indispensable." Id.
at 2808.
"[Wihen this Court reexamines a prior holding, its judgment is customarily informed
by a series of prudential and pragmatic considerations designed to test the consistency of
overruling a prior decision with the ideal of the rule of law. .. ." Id.
"[O]verruling Roe's central holding would not only reach an unjustifiable result un-
der principles of stare decisis, but would seriously weaken the Court's capacity to exercise
the judicial power and to function as the Supreme Court of a Nation dedicated to the rule
of law." Id. at 2814.
"An extra price will be paid by those who themselves disapprove of the decision's re-
sults when viewed outside of constitutional terms, but who nevertheless struggle to ac-
cept it, because they respect the rule of law." Id. at 2815.
"Like the character of an individual, the legitimacy of the Court must be earned over
time. So, indeed, must be the character of a Nation of people who aspire to live according
to the rule of law." Id. at 2816.
"A decision to overrule Roe's essential holding under the existing circumstances
would address error, if error there was, at the cost of both profound and unnecessary
damage to the Court's legitimacy, and to the Nation's commitment to the rule of law." Id.
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ened as to what constituted Souter's view of the rule of law other
than its vague connection to the doctrine of stare decisis.162 He com-
pensated for this absence of clarity by supplanting the rule of law
with an overarching theme of consequences. For Souter, stare decisis
may be the rule of law, but without consequences as his preunder-
standing or field of reference, the rule would be without meaning. 6 3
Souter's conception of the rule of law differs from the tradi-
tional positivistic view of the rule of law as a law of rules.' 4 Indeed,
the invocation of stare decisis conjures up images of this traditional-
ist legal theory; the very words connote a positivistic approach to
decision making-the reliance on precedent.
In contrast to the rule of law as the law of rules, associated
most closely with Justice Scalia, 1' 5 one commentator has described
Souter's approach-exemplified by the joint opinion in Casey-as
following a "rule of law as the law of standards,""" which "favors ad-
herence to precedent in the face of intense popular division, but a
standard-like interpretive approach and an operative constitutional
jurisprudence of 'delicate and sensitive' line-drawing and context
specific balancing tests." 6 7 Souter's position, however, is somewhat
different; it can be more accurately described as following a rule of
law as the law of consequences. In other words, it is better to de-
scribe Souter's approach to stare decisis not as a matter of methodol-
ogy, but as an interpretation influenced by the consequences of a
given decision. His approach is not as much a methodological inter-
pretation as it is a post hoc rationalization of the interpretation.
Stare decisis, then, is not the rule of law, as conceived by Souter, but
its rationalization.
162. All that is certain is that the rule of law is a metaphysical good, something that
should be aspired toward. It is an ideal, the faith in which promises stability, predictabil-
ity and legitimacy. As divined from the opinion, adherence to precedent, or stare decisis,
is the embodiment of the rule of law. In fact, the two concepts almost become synonymous
or interchangeable throughout Souter's opinion.
163. See STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND
THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARYAND LEGAL STUDIEs 120, 123-25 (1989).
164. See generally H.LA Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals,
71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958); see also H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).
165. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CH1. L. REV.
1175 (1989); Kathleen 1vL Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Foreword: The Jus
tices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 113-14 (1992) ("Justice Scalia's ap-
proach would overrule erroneous constitutional precedent without regard to stare decisis,
follow an interpretive rule that says stick to constitutional text and its most specific his-
toric tradition, and cast operative constitutional doctrines in rule-like form.").
166. Sullivan, supra note 165, at 115 (emphasis omitted); ef Anita L. Allen, Auton-
omy's Magic Wand: Abortion and Constitutional Interpretation, 72 B.U. L. REV. 683, 695
(1992) ("Casey pitted Justice Scalia's interpretivism against the model of neutral princi-
ples followed by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter.").
167. Sullivan, supra note 165, at 115 (citations omitted).
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In analyzing Souter's interpretation of stare decisis, it becomes
necessary to distinguish between his interpretation of the doctrine
and his actual employment of it. 1" The meaning of stare decisis-
and a fortiori, the rule of law-is governed by his "interpretive
commitment" to consequences.169 Souter does not really interpret
stare decisis in the literal sense; stare decisis is simply the term of
art he applies. Souter interprets the context or circumstances with
which he is faced in terms of what he objectifies as the consequences
of a given decision. By interpreting the context, Souter anticipates
the consequences of his interpretation and judges accordingly. Stare
decisis, then, is used as a rhetorical buttress to reinforce, legitimize,
and claim authoritativeness for his interpretation of the conse-
quences. As such, he uses the old positivistic vocabulary to justify
his pragmatic judgments. Casey represents his struggle between the
two vocabularies of positivism and pragmatism. For Souter, the act
of interpreting stare decisis is an act of construction-constructing
the doctrine to meet his interpretation of the context.
Although Souter aspires to the appearance of a foundational-
ist-relying on the rule of law or stare decisis-the decision in Casey
establishes him as a pragmatist. Whereas a conservative positivist
would overturn precedent when a case is wrongly decided and a
natural law or liberal rights theorist would overturn precedent in
order to reflect a particular right, Souter is not concerned about
whether a precedent is absolutely right or wrong, but whether it still
works. He is not as concerned with "getting it right" legally as he is
with the practical consequences of a decision. Thus, in Casey, Souter
did not ask whether Roe was wrongly decided or whether it was
binding precedent; rather, he examined the consequences of overrul-
ing such a decision to society and the Court. Unfortunately, he has
disingenuously chosen to shroud his brand of pragmatism with a
veil of stare decisis. The invocation of stare decisis and the rule of
law is a facade for Souter's pragmatism. Thus, stare decisis is not a
sacred doctrine, but a convenient rhetorical tool at his disposal. 170
Souter's commitment to the rule of law seems to be only a commit-
ment to his rule of law.'7 '
168. Cf Richard A. Rorty, The Pragmatist's Progress, in UMBERTO ECO ET AL.,
INTERPRETATION AND OVERINTERPRETATION 89, 100-01 (Stefan Collini ed., 1992).
169. See generally Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term-Foreword:
Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983); Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Di-
mension of the Agon Between Legal Power and Narrative Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2225
(1989).
170. Cf Thomas C. Grey, What Good is Legal Pragmatism?, in PRAGMATISM IN LAW
AND SocIETY 14 (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., 1991) ("For the pragmatist, cus-
tom is not sacred, it is just there.").
171. See generally Paul Brest, Interpretation and Interest, 34 STAN. L. REV. 765, 772
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B. Souter's Rhetoric and Narrative of Neutrality
In reality, the decision in Casey is not much more than rhetoric.
Despite his attempt to create a definitive standard for neutral or
objective adherence to precedent, Souter's contribution only adds to
the historical ambiguity of the doctrine. His quixotic attempt to
forge a neutral test 1 2 for the application or overriding of stare decisis
founders upon the very criteria to be applied. Stare decisis, as the
embodiment of the rule of law, denotes a positivistic sense of neutral
predictability and stability.'73 Ideally, it denotes judges who rule on
precedent irrespective of their own ideological predilections. This is
the neutral appearance that Souter labored to portray in Casey. 7 1
Nonetheless, the generous definition of Souter's criteria for deter-
mining when stare decisis should not be applied-unworkability, re-
liance, law's evolution-defies objective application. Consequently,
Roe will be further eroded and devalued over time until finally, so
little remains that the "essential holding" may be considered some-
thing of an anachronism qualified for overruling under the third
prong of Souter's test.7 5
(1982) ("Much of our commitment to the rule of law really seems a commitment to the
rule of our law.").
172. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959). But cf Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Cri-
tique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983) (examining
both the neutrality and interpretivism principles as imperfect theories which attempt to
preserve the role of the law by restraining the discretion ofjudges).
173. See, e.g., ROBERTO MYL UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 176 (1976) ("In the
broadest sense, the rule of law is defined by the interrelated notions of neutrality, uni-
formity, and predictability.").
174. Cf Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 373 (1982) (discussing
the radical indeterminacy of legal meaning); Joseph W. Singer, The Player and the Cards:
Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1 (1984) (arguing that since all legal doctrines or
paradigms are indeterminate, attempts to ground them on neutral, objective considera-
tions ignore the fact that such theories cannot ever be completely independent of one's
own view).
In discussing the rhetoric used by Justice Blackmun to transform the controversial
Roe v. Wade decision into a matter of logical technique that Blackmun called "constitu-
tional measurements, free of emotion and predilection," Singer's comments are equally
applicable to Casey:
I find this example typical because it demonstrates that even when everyone
agrees that a legal issue is politically controversial and that its resolution de-
pends on choosing between irreconcilable religious views and visions of social
life, jurists persist in asserting that the issue must be decided in a manner that
thrusts such considerations aside. It is obvious that a decision on the constitu-
tional legitimacy of laws limiting access to abortions must reflect controversial
judgments. Thus any intimation that the decision could be made in a logical
manner is ridiculous.
Id. at 32.
175. See supra part III.B.
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Souter's objective tests are dependent upon subjective deci-
sions. For example, unworkability-just like reliance or the evolu-
tion of the law-is a matter of degrees. He left the degree of unwork-
ability required to overrule precedent to subjective interpretation.
Given the potential for subjective influences, Souter simply cannot
ensure the promised certainty, stability and rule of law allegedly
embodied in his version of stare decisis. In attempting to achieve a
clearer definition of when stare decisis should be applied, he has
only accomplished a "new fuzziness." 6
In application, his theory will lend itself to increased indeter-
minacy and inconsistency of decisionaking. How can the three-
prong test be value-neutral? Each level of analysis-workability, re-
liance, legal evolution-provides more room for subjective interpre-
tation. There is no bright-line test as to what is workable, what
constitutes sufficient reliance, or what constitutes legal evolution. In
effect, Souter has created a tool whereby judges, except in rare,
glaringly obvious cases, have the flexibility to decide to follow prece-
dent at their own whim or fiat. 7  As such, claims of adherence to
stare decisis would amount to nothing more than masks for one's
intentions or rhetorical allies of those favoring prior decisions. 78 In
reaching for some form of determinacy, Souter has only achieved
greater indeterminacy which is unlikely to engender stability or re-
pose, but is likely to increase litigation over the abortion issue. 179
C. Social Policy
Souter implemented the doctrine of stare decisis in an attempt
to fashion the rule of law as a science of rules that could be distilled
to a three-prong test. His application of the doctrine, however, was
an act of social policy. 80 In reality, Souter merely created a political
176. Cf Robert Justin Lipkin, Beyond Skepticism, Foundationalism and the New
Fuzziness: The Role of Wide Reflective Equilibrium in Legal Theory, 75 CORNELL L. REV.
811, 864 (1990) (citations omitted).
177. See Monaghan, supra note 9, at 743. Monaghan notes:
Because a coherent rationale for the intermittent invocation of stare decisis has
not been forthcoming, the impression is created that the doctrine is invoked
only as a mask hiding other considerations. As a result, stare decisis seemingly
operates with the randomness of a lightning bolt: on occasion it may strike, but
when and where can be known only after the fact. A satisfactory theory of con-
stitutional adjudication requires more than that.
Id.
178. See id. at 747 n.143; Rehnquist, supra note 9, at 376 (arguing that the doctrine
of stare decisis should be rejected altogether).
179. See Tamar Lewin, Long Battles Over Abortion Are Seen, N.Y. TIMES, June 30,
1992, at A18; Ruth Marcus, Court's Ruling Assures More Abortion Litigation, WASH.
POST, July 1, 1992, at Al.
180. This is by no means a novel idea. See, e.g., OLIVER W. HOLiES, JR., THE
887
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compromise-a policy consideration that balances the consequences
of overruling a politically charged precedent. Thus, principle was
used to justify a decision that was generated by policy.181
Souter acknowledged that "one could classify Roe as sui gene-
ris."'5 2 Indeed, abortion may be considered one of the divisive issues
of our day. Without a middle ground, the extremely polarized nature
of the debate has been characterized as a "clash of absolutes."183
Having no sufficient answer to please everyone, Souter applied his
creative interpretation of stare decisis in an attempt to strike a
middle ground that would minimize the damage to the Court and
society. In effect, the decision reflected social consensus.18
For the Court, reconciling the abortion debate created a legit-
imization crisis. Souter claimed that to overrule Roe "under fire"
would devalue the Court's legitimacy. However, even in asserting
that the Court cannot bow to political pressure, he caved in to it. 18
COMiON LAW 35-46, 94-96 (1881) (asserting that public policy is at the heart of the com-
mon law and judicial behavior); see also Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism,
41 STAN. L. REV. 787, 814 (1989) ("Law is more a matter of experience than of logic, and
experience is tradition interpreted with one eye on coherence and another on policy."
(discussing the truism of Holmes' pragmatism)).
181. See RONALD M. DwoRmN, TAmNG RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 83 (1977) (explaining that
justifications for legislative programs usually require both principle and policy argu-
ments).
182. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2810 (1992). Indeed, the abor-
tion dispute might be considered the epitome of what Professor Dworkin would term a
"hard case." See generally DWORKIN, supra note 181, at 81-137. Souter attempted to fash-
ion the uniquely correct answer.
183. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES (1990).
184. Pollster Linda DiVall remarked: "What's quite interesting about the Supreme
Court's decision is that it seems to perfectly reflect the consensus opinion of mainstream
America." E.J. Dionne Jr., Justices' Abortion Ruling Mirrors Public Opinion: Polls Show
Americans Would Keep Procedure Legal, But Are as Divided as Court on Limits, WASH.
POST, July 1, 1992, at A4 (noting that in polls taken prior to the Casey decision, 55 com-
pared to 38% of those polled favored the right of abortion in the first three months, 80
compared to 18% favored the requirement that a pregnant teenager notify her parents,
and 56 compared to 41% favored limitations set by the states; however, unlike the Court,
63 compared to 30% favored the requirement of permission from a husband). But cf id.
("Paradoxically, the court found a principle that happened to fit with public opinion polls,
but I don't think it was actually following the polls." (quoting Yale Law Professor Paul
Gewirtz)). See generally ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962)
(arguing that ultimately the courts cannot enforce their judgments without the good will
of the people or at least of the other branches of government); Stephen L. Carter, Consti-
tutional Adjudication and the Indeterminate Text: A Preliminary Defense of an Imperfect
Muddle, 94 YALE L.J. 821, 843 (1985) ("On this view, the ultimate brake on the courts is
the judges' fear that if they go too far they will be ignored. To use the popular metaphor,
if the courts squander their scarce constitutional capital, they will have none left when
they need it most." (discussing BICKEL, supra)).
185. The institutional integrity argument, however, has its critics. No stranger to
angry opposition, Robert Bork comments:
Institutional integrity turns out to mean the Court must not overturn a wrong
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Essentially, Souter's consideration in deciding Casey was what
would happen if Roe were overturned; what would be the conse-
quences to society, to the Court, and to the Nation? His calculus was
not the effect of stare decisis and the rule of law on the issues, but
whether stare decisis could be used to affect the appropriate so-
ciocultural response. Accordingly, the consequences colored his vi-
sion of stare decisis and the rule of law.
Souter's plea for applying stare decisis in Casey, while simulta-
neously overturning parts of Roe, Thornburgh and Akron, was a feat
of clever marketing. To have overruled Roe outright would have
caused tremendous social upheaval. 8 6 To have simply overruled
Roe's progeny would have convinced skeptics that politics had af-
fected the Court and that Roe had already been overruled. By extol-
ling the virtues of stare decisis and assuring that the "essential
holding" of Roe was intact and affirm, Souter was able to overrule
much of Roe while giving the appearance that it retained preceden-
tial value. As an act of social policy, the decision artfully offered a
win-win-perhaps better described as a lose-lose-situation where
neither side could necessarily claim a victory. In so doing, the deci-
sion "dampen[ed] the possible ideological response."'87 As such,
Casey has been aptly described as a "Trojan Horse."18 8 In this way,
decision if there has been angry opposition to it. Nothing is said of the possible
perception that the Court reaffirms such a decision because there has been an-
gry support for it. There being political forces on both sides, principles of insti-
tutional integrity would seem to counsel deciding the case on the merits.
Bork, supra note 100.
186. In comparison, cases in the criminal context, like Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S.
808 (1991), are not likely to engender such social upheaval. Those cases can be more eas-
ily overturned because they do not pose the same threatening, far-reaching consequences.
187. Sullivan, supra note 165, at 110. Professor Sullivan elaborates:
Complicated arguments about pluralities, concurrences, and undue burdens are
hardly the stuff of political debate. It is much harder to mobilize pro-choice lob-
bying, voting, and fund-raising efforts if Roe is nickeled-and-dimed away rather
than frankly overruled. To the extent a moderate ruling grants partial victory to
the pro-choice side, it makes their claims of total calamity look strident or
churlish and leads even the party faithful to have some doubts.
Id. In short, "the Court stole their thunder." Id.
For example, the Freedom of Choice Act, H.R. 25, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), which
proposed to legislate Roe's protections, was all but forgotten in the pacifying wake of
Casey. Freedom of Choice Act Gets Hung Up; Action Delayed on Abortion Bill as Legisla-
tors Rethink.Strategy, STAR TRIBUNE, Aug. 3, 1992, at 7A, Nat Hentoff, The Fading Free-
doa of Choice Act, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 1992, at A19; Clifford Krauss, Democrats De-
ferring Abortion Rights Legislation, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1992, at A13; Nancy E. Roman,
Abortion bill put on hold for '92 election, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1992, at A2 ("Certainly
before the Supreme Court decision the rhetoric from the other side was that it was going
to be a much bigger issue in Congress, and it simply didn't happen." (quoting Mary
Sadick)).
188. Sullivan, supra note 165, at 108-09.
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although the decision seems moderate and does not overturn Roe
outright, much latitude remains for the lower courts to uphold re-
strictive statutes that essentially eviscerate Roe. 89
Essentially, Souter's creative application of stare decisis was
necessary to defuse an impending crisis. The abortion controversy
can be likened to a large, steam-filled vessel atop an open fire.
Therein, the pressure is growing and has been since 1973. Each de-
cision handed down by the Court which chipped away at Roe simply
added fuel to the fire such that by 1992, the seams of the vessel were
ready to burst from the increasing pressure. Casey acted as a safety
valve and allowed the Court to let off a little steam, a little pres-
sure.9 ' The fire below, however, has not subsided.
189. See id.
190. As a further policy consideration, one can speculate that Souter, like his
coauthors in Casey, has filled a void left by the departure of Justices Brennan and Mar-
shall, in the sense that the Court would be so far to the right that they are now the "left"
even if that left is moderate in reality.
At the time of Souter's nomination, he noted that "Justice Brennan is going to be
remembered as one of the most fearlessly principled guardians of the American Constitu-
tion that it has ever had and ever will have." 136 CONG. REC. S14,350 (daily ed. Oct. 2,
1990) (statement of Senator Kohl quoting David Souter). In the fall of 1992, Souter gave a
speech paying homage to Justice Brennan stating that "[wie see greatness in Justice
Brennan" and that "the sight and sound and thought of our contemporary world is in a
great measure the reflection of Justice Brennan's constitutional perceptions." Linda
Greenhouse, Liberal Giants Inspire Three Centrist Jurists, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 24, 1992, at
Al.
Similarly, Justices O'Connor and Kennedy wrote tributes in the Stanford Law Re-
view noting the strong influence and inspiration that Justice Thurgood Marshall had
upon them. Id.; see Sandra Day O'Connor, Thurgood Marshall: The Influence of a Racon-
teur, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1217, 1218, 1220 (1992) (recounting how Marshall's anecdotes
made clear "the impact of legal rules on human lives" and changed the way she viewed
the world); Anthony M. Kennedy, The Voice of Thurgood Marshall, 44 STAN. L. REV 1221,
1221, 1224 (1992) (opining that Marshall's voice will continue to be heard and quoting
from a poem: "Thou has left behind powers that will work for thee ... thou has great al-
lies") (citations omitted)).
Perhaps the presence of Brennan and Marshall on the Court caused O'Connor and
Kennedy to move toward the right. With Marshall and Brennan's retirement, Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy can drift toward the middle. See Sullivan, supra note 165, at 120
("As Justices come and go, those left behind will fan out to ensure reasoned deliberation
that takes the full range of ideological differences into account.").
At his confirmation hearings, Souter said that he brought to the Court the under-
standing that every decision affects the lives of people. It is quite possible that Justices
Souter, O'Connor and Kennedy-in the absence of Justices Brennan and Marshall-are
taking more closely to heart the fact that every decision the Court hands down has the
potential to affect many people in profound ways. Perhaps a sense of duty is coloring their
reasoning. Essentially, they can be seen as rising to the challenge that a change in the
Court's personnel does not necessitate a change in its jurisprudence.
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V. CONCLUSION
Tom Rath, a close friend of Souter, describes the Justice's view
of his role: "He has a vision of the Court as a moderating influence to
serve as a unifying part of the country, between the more partisan
executive and legislative branches. I think there is a central core of
David Souter that sees the Court as a conciliator and legitimizer,
bringing society together."' Rath claims that Souter has espoused
this vision since his days as a judge in New Hampshire. 92 Rath's
comments not only offer a window to view Souter as he views him-
self, but helps explain what motivates his jurisprudence, particu-
larly with respect to his interpretation of stare decisis. Souter uses
stare decisis as the embodiment of the rule of law to legitimize the
Court, but his rule of law is a rule of consequences-a pragmatic ap-
proach that acts as the unifying element or conciliator of society.
Stare decisis is something of a chimerical myth. In Souter's
hands, stare decisis' promise of certainty and stability is no less
mythical; however, in his hands, the myth is a palatable one.'93 Re-
grettably, Souter's grand, almost evangelical plea for the application
of stare decisis is impoverished in practice. In Casey, as in Beam,
Payne, and Lee, Souter presents something of a "keep-what-you-
want-and-throw-away-the-rest version"1  of stare decisis. By picking
and choosing which precedent to follow and affording much heed to
sociopolitical consequences, he allows and invites the "rule of law" to
be undermined and influenced by subjective decisions and value
judgments. 5 If Justice Marshall had intended his Payne dissent to
instruct Souter in the sober need for stare decisis, it appears as if
Souter embraced the rhetoric but neglected the underlying sub-
stance.
Nietzsche opined that "tihe worst readers are those who act
like plundering soldiers. They take out some things that they might
use, cover the rest with ifith and confusion and defame the whole."9
191. Jeffrey Rosen, Poetic Justice: The Education of David Souter, NEW REPUBLIC,
Mar. 8, 1993, at 25.
192. Id.
193. The purpose of this Comment is not to criticize the outcome of Casey; rather it
simply questions the central paradox upon which it rests. There is really no question that
stare decisis is and has always been something of an indeterminate, malleable doctrine.
See supra note 9. What Souter does is to extol the virtues of determinacy and legitimacy
(the rule of law), while exploiting the indeterminacy (overruling parts of Roe), and leaving
the doctrine vulnerable to increased indeterminate interpretations (the three-prong test).
194. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2881 (1992) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
195. As such, future abortion decisions may become something of a "chain novel,"
changing from judge to judge and holding an unknown mystery ending. See RONALD
DWORKIN, A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE 150 (1985).
196. Richard Weisberg, On the Use and Abuse of Nietzsche for Modern Constitu-
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Nietzsche's caveat concerning textual interpretation is quite poign-
ant when considering the interpretation of precedent and the doc-
trine of stare decisis. While attempting to avoid a "jurisprudence of
doubt,"197 Souter succeeded only in creating a "jurisprudence of con-
fusion,"19 and defaming the doctrine of stare decisis. The impact of
Souter's interpretation on the doctrine of stare decisis and the rule of
law is yet uncertain; the mystery, however, is less than comforting.
tional Theory, in INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE: A HERMENEUTIC READER 182
(Sanford Levinson & Steven Mailloux eds., 1988) (quoting NIETEcHE, HUiAN, ALL-
TOo-HU IAN).
197. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2803.
198. Id. at 2880 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
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